Using a unique dataset of foreign and domestic IPOs listings in the US from 1990 to 2012, we study how foreignness affects IPO liquidity. We find that foreign IPOs enjoy higher liquidity than IPOs in their home countries, but do not fully gain the same liquidity benefits as for IPOs of domestic US issuers. In contrast to prior evidence for mature cross-listed firms, we show that liquidity differentials between foreign and domestic IPOs in the US are determined by information asymmetry related to foreignness rather than to home-country institutional environment characteristics. Thus, our results extend prior findings to reveal salient differences in liquidity and liquidity determinants between IPOs offerings by foreign and domestic firms in the US.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of foreignness in the international business literature has traditionally been investigated in the context of globalized product markets (Zaheer, 1995; Mata and Freitas, 2012) . This study contributes empirically to an emerging conceptual discussion regarding the effects of foreignness in international capital markets (e.g., Bell, Filatotchev and Rasheed, 2012; Filatotchev, Bell and Rasheed, 2016) . Specifically, we examine whether firms that conduct initial public offerings (IPOs) abroad enjoy the same liquidity advantages as local host market firms, or rather suffer from a "liability of foreignness".
1,2 A foreignness liquidity liability is salient for foreign IPOs, both because of their increasing numbers and because they differ in important regards from firms that cross-list with documented benefits for capital costs (Pagano, 1993; Pagano et al., 2001 ), corporate governance (Peng and Su, 2014) , strategic decision making (Markovitch, Steckel and Yeung, 2005; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Foucault and Frésard, 2012; Peng and Su, 2014) , product scope, growth, and valuation (Gande et al., 2009) . Liquidity is a key determinant of these benefits and is cited as a primary motivator for foreign listings (e.g., Saudagaran, 1988; Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995; Blass and Yafeh, 2001; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Karolyi, 2006) . Yet the relation between foreignness and IPO liquidity, a key component of transaction costs in capital markets, remains largely unexamined to date.
We examine IPOs on US exchanges from 1990 to 2012, which dominate in numbers and capitalization, with two sets of findings. First, we find that foreign IPO shares are systematically less liquid than comparable domestic US IPOs. This liquidity differential indicates that foreign IPOs continue to experience frictions described in Bell et al. (2012) despite the net benefits to their listings. We argue that information asymmetries are a key source of these frictions, documenting that underpricing differentials are significant determinants of the liquidity liability. We further find that uncertainty plays a role as foreign firms with more volatile shares exhibit larger liquidity differentials than comparable domestic IPO listers. Second, we extend institutional 1 Zaheer (1995: 343) defines foreignness as reflecting "all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur", yet prior studies have focused primarily on transportation and coordination costs, unfamiliarity with foreign institutions, and perceived legitimacy of foreign firms (for a comprehensive review see Rugman, Verbeke and Nguyen, 2011) . 2 We define liquidity as the ease of trading a desired quantity of a specific financial asset quickly and at low cost (Kyle, 1985; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 ).
bonding theory regarding how a firm's home country institutions affect its "liquidity discount" in an overseas capital market. Specifically, we provide evidence that foreign shares are not regarded differently from each other with respect to liquidity based upon their home country institutions. This finding contrasts with prior evidence for cross-listed shares, whose liquidity is strongly influenced by home country institutional characteristics.
Considered altogether, our findings reveal salient differences in liquidity between foreign and domestic IPO listings and cross-listings in the US that are consistent with related informational asymmetries, thereby serving to extend and clarify prior findings regarding the net benefits and costs of foreign listings (Bell et al., 2012) . In particular, our findings document a "liability of foreignness" for foreign versus domestic US listings that in part offsets the net liquidity advantage of listing in the US rather than in a home country market.
Importantly, we find in contrast to prior findings for foreign US cross-listed firms, that liquidity for foreign IPO firms is not significantly influenced by their home country institutional environments, consistent with added information asymmetry. In this regard, our findings are consistent with a domestic investor information disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign investors, irrespective of foreign locale (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009) , where the absence of alternative and not perfectly connected trading venues does not impose additional liquidity costs as for cross-listed shares (Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998) . Finally, we generalize the findings by Blass and Yafeh (2001) for Israeli firms listed abroad to show that on average foreign IPO firms enjoy a higher level of liquidity in US markets than their home market liquidity.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature and formulates our hypotheses.
The following section provides a description of the data. The empirical analysis and robustness tests appear in following sections, with the final section providing a discussion and summary.
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Liquidity in IPOs
Among factors identified by prior research as influencing firms' decisions to list abroad, a key motivation is enhanced liquidity as confirmed by surveys of CFO intent (e.g., Saudagaran 1988; Fanto and Karmel, 1997; Bancel and Mittoo, 2001; Doidge et al., 2004; Karolyi, 2006) . More specifically, firms that list abroad in deep and liquid markets have been found to benefit from reduced capital constraints and costs, more informative feedback from stock prices, and enhanced strategy, investment and growth options (e.g., Pagano et al., 2001; Doidge et al., 2004; Helwege, Pirinsky and Stulz, 2007; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Francis, Hasan, Lothian and Sun, 2010; Foucault and Frésard, 2012; Mortal and Reisel, 2013) . More liquid shares are also associated with value-enhancing shareholders' activism and monitoring (Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004; Edmans, Fang and Zur, 2013; Norli, Ostergaard and Schindele, 2015) , notably for cross-listing firms (Fresard and Salva, 2010) . Nonetheless, Bell et al. (2012) argue that foreign firms also may be subject to frictions arising from information asymmetries and institutional differences when accessing overseas capital markets that offset these benefits.
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) identify bonding with US institutions as a key source of these benefits for foreign firms listing in the US. In addition to legal bonding, they argue that access to reputable intermediaries and institutional investors contributes to the reduction of agency problems and information asymmetries. These benefits may extend beyond the initial offering since underwriters tend to become market makers after completing their price stabilization role (Ellis et al., 2002) . In addition, specialists' portfolios that focus on certain types of shares may improve their ability to extract information and reduce information asymmetries. Corroborating evidence indicates that firms are more likely to list in a foreign market that has the largest peer presence from the same industry and country (e.g., Caglio, Weiss Hanley; Marietta-Westberg, 2016). However, evidence is limited regarding potential offsetting effects to foreignness for IPOs, for which information availability is more limited compared to cross-listings, and which have come to dominate as a listing mode for prominent classes of foreign listers.
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Of particular relevance to foreign listings is liquidity. For cross-listings, prior studies find that foreign shares are systematically less liquid than domestic ones (Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Bacidore, Battalio, Galpin and Jennings, 2005) , with the strength of home country institutions a determinant of this liquidity (Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006) . Specifically, cross-listing has been found to help mitigate adverse liquidity effects of poor home country institutions (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Stulz, 2009; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2010) . However, cross-listing creates the potential for improvements or reductions in market quality depending on home-market transparency (Domowitz et al., 1998; Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008) , with the presence of alternative and imperfectly connected trading venues increasing the potential for both informed trading and increased costs associated with dealing across markets (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010) . However, foreign firms listing in the US via IPOs by nature will be less influenced by home country institutions and by cross-market information flows regarding home country share trading. They also differ from cross-listers in other regards that may influence liquidity.
First, regulatory and disclosure requirements play a role in firms' decision to list abroad (Biddle and Saudagaran, 1991) . In particular, when foreign firms transition from private to public ownership in the US they must follow the same Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) registration procedures as domestic firms, 4 and abide by the same stock exchange listing requirements. By comparison, cross-listed firms can file preliminary registration statements confidentially with the SEC, resolve many issues without public disclosure, and list with expedited exchange reviews. IPO firms listing in the US via these more stringent reporting and review requirements have thus been argued to bond more closely to US institutions relative to cross-listed firms, thereby helping to alleviate agency and asymmetric information problems and reduce their cost of capital (Stulz, 1999; Bell et al., 2012) . Possible countervailing effects include the absence of prior trading history, their unfamiliarity more broadly to domestic investors, and the lack of comparable home country liquidity measures.
Second, foreign IPO shares listed and traded on US markets, while traded in a variety of alternative venues, are largely consolidated (O'Hara and Ye, 2011) . This contrasts with cross-listed firms that trade simultaneously in two or more markets and may have a longer trading history in their home country markets. 
The Role of Home Country Institutions
Prior studies document for cross-listed shares that home country institutions influence their US liquidity (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006; Stulz, 2009; Doidge et al., 2010) , with cross-listed firms from less (more) transparent locales exhibiting lower (higher) US liquidity (Domowitz et al., 1998; Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008 [ Table 1 about here]
Measuring Liquidity
We measure liquidity using the Amihud (2002) ratio that estimates price sensitivity to transaction volume. Specifically, we compute the monthly average of the ratio of the daily absolute returns to the dollar volume for each stock in the sample, as follows:
where ret i,t is the return of stock i in day t, dvol i,t is the daily trading volume of stock i in dollars and T m is the number of daily observations in month m. We then multiply the measure by 10 6 . Since we are interested in liquidity, we also change the sign to obtain LIQ i,m , so that higher ratio values reflect higher levels of liquidity.
In a horse race exercise comparing different liquidity measures at different frequencies, Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud ratio performs well among proxies for the price impact of transactions. To assess the robustness of our findings, we also conduct our analysis using bid-ask spreads as a proxy for liquidity as presented in the robustness tests section and Table 7 .
5 As robustness checks, we include in the main regressions indicator variables for IPOs from Israel, China, UK and Canada separately, then all indicators together, and separately exclude IPOs from each of these countries, with qualitatively similar findings. Results are available from the authors upon request.
Control variables
Following prior studies, we introduce explanatory variables to control for other influences on liquidity.
6 Specifically, we expect IPOs with more reputable underwriters (Corwin et al., 2004; Mantecon and Poon, 2009 ) and more insider ownership (Hahn, Ligon and Rhodes, 2013) to be associated with higher liquidity.
Following Booth and Chua (1996) , we also expect shares of larger IPOs, proxied by their proceeds, to be more liquid due to the ease of valuation relative to smaller deals.
A large strand of literature investigates the relationship between underpricing and secondary market liquidity. Several studies find that firms engage in higher levels of underpricing in order to offset the costs associated with information asymmetry problems and to increase market liquidity (e.g., Booth and Chua, 1996; Hahn et al., 2013) . Other studies document a signaling effect of underpricing that helps to attract a larger investor base and more analyst coverage (e.g., Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack, 2002) . In addition, higher liquidity is positively related to higher institutional investors' ownership since firms tend to attract institutional investors through higher initial underpricing of their shares (Zheng and Li, 2008) . Overall, these studies point toward a positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity. Contrary to these works, Ellul and Pagano we control for the NYSE and NASDAQ in a robustness test and confirm the main results. 7 The differing results also may be attributable to the liquidity proxies employed (see Hahn et al., 2013) . Ellul and Pagano (2006) focus on the impact of informed trading on liquidity by using the probability of informed trading and the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Nevertheless, liquidity is a broad concept that encompasses several dimensions (Kyle, 1985) . Thus, it is reasonable that studies that do not focus on a specific information component but employ measures related to the price impact of transactions or overall transaction costs (including the inventory and market-making costs) also offer different insights (Hahn et al., 2013) . For these reasons, and since we focus on the price impact of transactions captured by the Amihud (2002) measure, we expect to find a positive relationship between underpricing and liquidity.
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In addition to IPO characteristics, stock characteristics may also affect liquidity levels. Several studies have documented that assets with higher contemporaneous returns and lower volatility are more liquid (Stoll, 1978 , Amihud, 2002 . Furthermore, recent evidence shows a positive relationship between liquidity and institutional ownership (Zheng and Li, 2008; Hahn et al., 2013) . Thus, we expect shares with higher returns, lower volatility and higher institutional ownership to have a higher level of liquidity. [ Table 2 about here] Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients. As expected, we find that firm size is positively and significantly correlated with book-to-market, proceeds, and underwriter quality. In addition, larger and more leveraged firms experience lower volatility and more institutional ownership after listing. Underpricing is larger when recent market returns and insider holdings are higher. Moreover, underpricing is positively related to volatility. With respect to IPO proceeds, smaller IPOs are associated with more volatile shares and lower institutional ownership. Finally, shares with higher quality underwriters have also larger institutional ownership.
[ Table 3 about here]
RESULTS
Initial evidence regarding the liquidity of foreign and matching US domestic IPOs is shown in Figure 1 .
Panel A illustrates that liquidity levels measured using the Amihud ratio of foreign and matching domestic IPO shares. Both exhibit higher liquidity in the immediate post-listing time period, followed by falling liquidity levels over a longer time horizon. This pattern is consistent with prior findings regarding trading volume for 
Liquidity Differences Between Foreign and Domestic US IPOs
To formally test whether foreign IPOs face a systematic liquidity disadvantage relative to comparable domestic IPOs, we examine liquidity differences between foreign and domestic US IPOs using both univariate and multivariate tests. As presented in Table 4 (Panel A), we find that differences are significant across all time periods, with foreign IPO shares less liquid than those of matched domestic counterparts. These findings are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude from the sample the IPOs that took place during the bubble period of 1999 -2000 (as in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm Jr., 2003 . 9 In a robustness test reported in the robustness tests section and Table 7 , we also confirm these findings for liquidity measured using the bid-ask spread.
To shed light on underlying reasons for these observed liquidity differences, and to control for other influences on liquidity, we compare foreign and matching domestic IPO firms in a multivariate setting.
Specifically, we regress liquidity differences between matched domestic and foreign IPO shares on the differences in explanatory variables as follows:
where ∆LIQ i,m is the difference between the matched domestic and foreign stock i of the daily Amihud ratio averaged over month m. ∆FIRM are the differences in firm characteristics -i.e., recent sales, book-to-market, and leverage ratio. ∆IPO are the differences in IPO characteristics -i.e., underpricing, IPO proceedings, insiders, underwriter quality, and recent market returns. ∆STOCK represents the differences in stock characteristics -i.e., return, volatility, and institutional ownership. [ Table 4 about here]
Thus, we find that liquidity differences are related to asymmetric information, which is neither attenuated nor offset by underpricing and reputable underwriters. In addition, we find that liquidity differences are related to foreign shares' higher volatility that leads to lower liquidity levels.
Global IPOs and Multiple Trading Venues
In this section, we extend the study of the underlying reasons for these observed liquidity differences by explicitly taking into account the role of multiple trading venues. On one hand, trading across venues may lead to a wider investor base and reduce information asymmetry between market participants (e.g., dealers
and investors) resulting in lower transaction costs and higher liquidity (e.g., Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002) .
On the other hand, prior findings suggest that the presence of alternative and imperfectly connected trading venues may increase information asymmetry between market participants and thus impose additional liquidity costs for cross-listed shares (Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998).
We estimate equation (2) foreign IPO shares to home market liquidity measured by the value-weighted average of the Amihud ratio (changed of sign to measure liquidity) of all shares that comprise the home country stock market index. We find that the liquidity of foreign shares in the US is significantly higher than the liquidity of the home country stock market. Specifically, the average liquidity of foreign IPO shares in the first month of listing is -0.05 compared with an average home market liquidity of -0.22.
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Second, focusing on Canada, China, Israel, and the UK, we gather data on domestic IPOs in these markets 11 For robustness, we confirm the results for the alternative liquidity measure, the bid-ask spread (untabulated). 12 Comparing our results with mature cross-listed evidence in prior literature, we infer that our foreign IPO sample is sensibly less liquid than mature cross-listed stocks. Bacidore & Sofianos (2002) report an average spread of 1.17% for non-US stocks (1.62% for emerging non-US) listed on the NYSE in the sample period of their analysis, that is July 1998. We conduct a similar test for foreign IPOs listed in the US in 1998 and find a spread of 2.77%. Global IPOs are different from mature cross-listers since they do not have any previous transaction history at the time of listing. 13 Due to lack of data for the calculation of the Amihud ratios for certain countries, the sample size is 301 foreign IPOs.
in the same year, country, and industry as the foreign IPOs in our samples. We then build the average Amihud measures of the matching domestic newly listed shares at the same horizons and compare them to the Amihud ratios of our foreign IPOs in the US. The average liquidity of US foreign IPO shares in the first month of listing is -0.16 while the average liquidity of home country IPO shares is lower at -2.19. 14 We find that on average, foreign IPOs in the US are more liquid than domestic IPOs in their home markets. Thus, even though they suffer from a "liability of foreignness", foreign firm IPOs still enjoy higher liquidity by listing in the US rather than in their home markets.
Home Country Institutions
In this section, we consider Hypothesis 2 that the liquidity of foreign IPOs listing in the US is unrelated to the strength of their home institutional environment. We measure the strength of home institutions (HOME) using the product of two measures. The first is the La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) index of anti-director rights, as adjusted by Spamann (2010) . 15 The second is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Law and Order index. 16 We use the product of these two measures because the anti-director rights index covers only aspects of de-jure regulation captured by six sub-indices indicating the letter of the law, not its enforcement in practice (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 2010) . By comparison, the Law and Order index assesses the de-facto law and order traditions including enforcement and legal system. We then assign a country-year score according to the year of the IPO and its home country to capture both de-jure and de-facto aspects of investor protection (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Bruno and Claessens, 2010; Bell, Filatotchev and Aguilera, 2014) . We next divide the sample into strong (weak) home institutions sub-samples according to whether the country's score falls above (below/at) the sample median of the product of these two measures. The indicator HOME is set equal to one if the country's score is above the sample 14 Due to lack of data availability for the matching of IPO shares, the sample is 55 foreign IPOs.
15 Spamann (2010) shows that his revised index markedly differs from both the La Porta et al. (1998) 
where LIQ i,m is the daily Amihud ratio of foreign stock i averaged over month m. FIRM are the firm characteristics -i.e., recent sales, book-to-market, and leverage ratio. IPO are the IPO characteristics -i.e., underpricing, IPO proceedings, insiders, underwriter quality, recent market returns, and SOX for listing following the introduction of the SOX Act. STOCK are the share characteristics -i.e., return, volatility, and institutional ownership. As presented in Table 6 (Panel B), the multivariate results confirm the univariate results in finding no significant impact of home institutional environment on the liquidity of foreign IPO shares listed in the US, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
[ Table 6 about here]
Measuring liquidity alternatively using the bid-ask spreads, we find that shares of foreign firms from countries with weaker institutions are on average less liquid than those from countries with stronger institutions in the univariate tests at 2 months (at 1% significance level), 3 months (at 1% significance level), 6 (at 5% significance level) months and 12 months (at 10% significance level) after their IPO. However, these differences are insignificant in the multivariate setting and thus do not provide robust evidence of a consistent liquidity difference related to home country institutions after controlling for other liquidity determinants.
Overall, our findings for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 2 indicate that foreign firms obtain a liquidity advantage 17 An alternative approach is to calculate the median score for each year and thus HOME is set to one if the country's score in a particular year is above that year's median. However, country scores are very stable and little difference results between the measures.
by conducting their IPOs in the US rather than in their home country markets, they nevertheless still suffer from a "liability of foreignness" compared with US domestic IPOs that does not relate to the quality of their home institutional environment as was found previously for foreign US cross-listed shares. These findings are consistent with the theoretical model of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
We first conduct the analysis above with the bid-ask spread as an alternative measure of transaction costs measured by subtracting the bid from ask price and scaling the difference by the mid-price (Ellul and Pagano, 2006; Chung and Zhang, 2014) . 18 We confirm that on average the bid-ask spreads of foreign IPO shares are higher than for comparable US domestic IPO shares (Table 7 , Panel A). Multivariate regression results also yield qualitatively similar findings in Table 7 (Panel B). Thus, in addition to a greater price impact of transactions, foreign IPO shares have also larger bid-ask spreads than comparable US domestic shares.
[ Table 7 about here]
Our results also are robust to matching foreign and US domestic shares using market capitalization at the end of the first day of trading and propensity score matching by multiple factors. With regard to the latter, we follow the propensity score matching procedure in Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) (2006); (3) the law enforcement index from La Porta et al. (1998) f o l l o w i n g Chung (2006) and Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2006) . Furthermore, we test for geographical distance, home bias, Economic Freedom index, Euromoney index, common vs. civil law, and cultural differences (Hofstede's index following Tang and Koveos, 2008) . We also follow Cumming, Johan and Li (2011) to consider (1) the price manipulation index, (2) the volume manipulation index, (3) the spoofing index, (4) the false disclosure index, (5) the market manipulation index, (6) the insider trading index, and (7) the broker-agency index, and to account for regulation changes, we consider the indexes individually and for the periods before and after the adoption in November 2007 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). Consistent with our main results, we do not find the quality of the home country regulatory system to significantly influence the liquidity differences of foreign IPO shares listed in the US. 19 We also employ alternative specifications and confirm our results. These alternatives include radius matching, kernalbased and bootstrap matching when the controls for selection are based on multiple observable firm characteristics. These include the natural logarithm of total assets in the last financial year preceding the IPO, Industry and year fixed effects, market-to-book ratio in in the first day of listing, leverage ratio, market return in the 30 days preceding the IPO, insiderholding levels after the completion of the IPO, and the underpricing levels. Results are untabulated for brevity, but available from the authors upon request. 20 Results are untabulated for brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the liquidity patterns of foreign IPOs in US stock markets. As such, we extend the ongoing discussion in the IB literature regarding why foreign IPO firms choose to list abroad to reveal differences between IPO and cross-listed firms. We argue that foreign IPOs are fundamentally different from cross-listed firms studied previously, combining information problems associated with both the specific lifecycle event of transitioning from private to public as well as informational and institutional differences. Whereas these features lend themselves to added bonding to the institutional environment in the US, the fact that foreign IPO firms have originated outside of the US could still subject them to a liability of foreignness in liquidity.
Using a unique matched dataset, we compare liquidity levels of different time periods up to three years post-listing of foreign and domestic IPOs in the US. We find lower liquidity in foreign relative to domestic US IPOs in all the post-IPO time periods. However, in contrast to prior literature on liquidity in cross-country and cross-listing settings, we find that in foreign IPOs listed in the US, home country institutional environments do not play a significant role in determining liquidity levels as for cross-listed US listers. In addition, we document a relationship between the IPO characteristics and liquidity differentials. Specifically, greater underpricing for foreign as opposed to domestic IPOs is associated with lower liquidity differences in their shares. Thus, foreign shares are able to enjoy similar, or higher, levels of liquidity as domestic ones when they offer investors and dealers larger initial returns. Also, consistent with mature shares, we find that higher uncertainty, measured by volatility, is associated with greater liquidity differentials. Moreover, multiple listings in various markets is associated with reduced liquidity differentials. With respect to the liquidity motivation of listing abroad, we find that foreign IPO shares are more liquid than index shares in their home markets and matching IPOs in their home countries. Thus, although foreign IPOs enjoy higher liquidity relative to their home countries, they do not fully gain the benefits associated with liquid secondary markets to the same extent as domestic US IPOs.
Collectively, these findings contribute to the debate surrounding the motivation of foreign firms to list in the US and provide useful evidence as to the applicability of certain theories such as bonding and avoidance as well as the liquidity theorem with respect to foreign IPOs. Together, our results suggest that foreign IPOs differ in liquidity from both cross-listed firms and from domestic US IPOs. Our findings further suggest that this effect can be managed and potentially reduced if the legal, reporting, and enforcement settings that are available to investors in the primary market are also made available in the secondary market. Notes: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables for all domestic and foreign shares in our sample in Panel A and the matched sample in Panel B. SIZE is total sales of firms at year-end prior to listing, BtoM is book-to-market ratio at year-end prior to listing, LEV is total debt over total assets at year-end prior to listing, UP is underpricing, PROC is log of the proceeds from the IPO, INSIDER is ratio of shares owned by insiders over total shares outstanding, HOT is market returns in the 30 days prior to listing, UW is underwriter quality, RET is monthly average returns of the shares, VOL is monthly standard deviation of daily returns and HOLD is share of institutional ownership. The last three measures are multiplied by 10 2 . More details of the explanatory variables are reported in the Appendix. The last column reports the p-values of the t-test for the significance of the difference between the mean values from zero of the variables for domestic and foreign shares. Notes: Correlation coefficients of the variables, averaged across foreign and matched domestic IPOs, are reported in the table. SIZE is total sales of firms at year-end prior to listing, BtoM is book-to-market ratio at year-end prior to listing, LEV is total debt over total assets at year-end prior to listing, UP is underpricing, HOT is market returns in the 30 days prior to listing, PROC is log of proceeds from the IPO, INSIDER is ratio of shares owned by insiders over total shares outstanding, UW is underwriter quality, RET is monthly average returns of shares, VOL is monthly standard deviation of daily returns, and HOLD is share of institutional ownership. The last three measures are multiplied by 10 2 . More details of the explanatory variables are reported in the Appendix. 
APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
